Philosophical Explorations 17 (3):265-278 (2014)

Naomi Eilan
University of Warwick
This introductory paper sets out a framework for approaching some of the claims about the second person made by the papers collected in the special edition of Philosophical Explorations on The Second Person . It does so by putting centre stage the notion of a ‘bipolar second person relation’, and examining ways of giving it substance suggested by the authors of these papers. In particular, it focuses on claims made in these papers about the existence and/or nature of second person thought, second person reasons for action and second person reasons for belief and about possible connections among thought-theoretical, ethical and epistemological issues and debates in this area
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DOI 10.1080/13869795.2014.941910
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References found in this work BETA

Intention.G. Anscombe - 1957 - Harvard University Press.
Testimony, Trust, and Authority.Benjamin McMyler - 2011 - Oxford University Press.

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Epistemology Personalized.Matthew A. Benton - 2017 - Philosophical Quarterly 67 (269):813-834.
God and Interpersonal Knowledge.Matthew A. Benton - 2018 - Res Philosophica 95 (3):421-447.

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