Dialectica 59 (3):367–374 (2005)
The notion of a rigid designator was originally introduced with respect to a modal semantics in which only one world, the world of evaluation, is shifted. Several philosophical applications employ a modal semantics which shifts not just the world of evaluation, but also the world considered as actual. How should the notion of a rigid designator be generalized in this setting? In this note, I show that there are two options and argue that, for the currently most popular application of two-dimensional modal semantics, proper names ought to be treated as rigid relative to the world considered as actual.
|Keywords||Rigid designation Counteractuality|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
Themes From Kaplan.Joseph Almog, John Perry & Howard K. Wettstein (eds.) - 1989 - Oxford University Press, Usa.
Two Notions of Necessity.Martin Davies & Lloyd Humberstone - 1980 - Philosophical Studies 38 (1):1-31.
Citations of this work BETA
Relativized Propositions and the Fregean Orthodoxy.Iris Einheuser - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (3):590-603.
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