Fiction, indifference, and ontology

Abstract
In this paper I outline an alternative to hermeneutic fictionalism, an alternative I call indifferentism, with the same advantages as hermeneutic fictionalism with respect to ontological issues but avoiding some of the problems that face fictionalism. The difference between indifferentism and fictionalism is this. The fictionalist about ordinary utterances of a sentence S holds, with more orthodox views, that the speaker in some sense commits herself to the truth of S. It is only that for the fictionalist this is truth in the relevant fiction. According to the indifferentist, by contrast, we are simply non-committal – or indifferent – with respect to some aspects of what is literally said in our assertive utterances
Keywords Analytic Philosophy  Contemporary Philosophy  Philosophy of Mind
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ISBN(s) 0031-8205
DOI 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2005.tb00471.x
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References found in this work BETA
Objects and Persons.Trenton Merricks - 2001 - Oxford University Press.
Conversational Impliciture.Kent Bach - 1994 - Mind and Language 9 (2):124-162.

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Citations of this work BETA
Defusing Easy Arguments for Numbers.Brendan Balcerak Jackson - 2013 - Linguistics and Philosophy 36 (6):447-461.
Philosophy of Religion, Fictionalism, and Religious Diversity.Victoria Harrison - 2010 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 68 (1):43-58.
Fictionalism in Metaphysics.Frederick Kroon - 2011 - Philosophy Compass 6 (11):786-803.

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