Meaning‐Constitutivity

Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 50 (6):559-574 (2007)
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Abstract

I discuss some problems faced by the meaning‐inconsistency view on the liar and sorites paradoxes which I have elsewhere defended. Most of the discussion is devoted to the question of what a defender of the meaning‐inconsistency view should say about semantic competence

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10.1080/00201740701698506

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Matti Eklund
Uppsala University

Citations of this work

Replacing truth.Kevin Scharp - 2007 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 50 (6):606 – 621.
Nothing Is True.Will Gamester - 2023 - Journal of Philosophy 120 (6):314-338.

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References found in this work

The Philosophy of Philosophy.Timothy Williamson - 2007 - Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell.
Replacing Truth.Kevin Scharp - 2013 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press UK.
Modal Epistemology and the Rationalist Renaissance.George Bealer - 2002 - In Tamar Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Conceivability and Possibility. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 71-125.
A counterexample to modus ponens.Vann McGee - 1985 - Journal of Philosophy 82 (9):462-471.

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