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Reply to Beall and Priest
Australasian Journal of Logic 6:94-106 (2008)
Abstract
In my “Deep Inconsistency”, I compared my meaning-inconsistency view on the liar with Graham Priest’s dialetheist view, using my view to help cast doubt on Priest’s arguments for his view. Jc Beall and Priest have recently published a reply to my article. I here respond to their criticisms. In addition, I compare the meaning–inconsistency view with Anil Gupta and Nuel Belnap’s revision theory of truth, and discuss how best to deal with the strengthened liar.Author's Profile
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Citations of this work
The Law of Non-Contradiction as a Metaphysical Principle.Tuomas E. Tahko - 2009 - Australasian Journal of Logic 7:32-47.
Inconsistency and replacement.Matti Eklund - 2019 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 62 (4):387-402.
Paradojas, contradicción y principios constitutivos del significado.Diego Tajer - 2013 - Páginas de Filosofía (Universidad Nacional del Comahue) 14 (17):49-65.
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