Philosophical Studies 113 (2):153-80 (2003)

Authors
Laura Ekstrom
College of William and Mary
Abstract
This paper proposes a reconciliation between libertarian freedomand causal indeterminism, without relying on agent-causation asa primitive notion. I closely examine Peter van Inwagen''s recentcase for free will mysterianism, which is based in part on thewidespread worry that undetermined acts are too chancy to befree. I distinguish three senses of the term chance I thenargue that van Inwagen''s case for free will mystrianism fails,since there is no single construal of the term change on whichall of the premises of his argument for free will–causalindeterminism incompatibilism are true. By use of a particularevent-causal indeterminist account of free action, I support thecase for free will–indeterminism compatibilism.
Keywords Chance  Compatibilism  Free Will  Indeterminism  Metaphysics  Mystery  Van Inwagen, P
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DOI 10.1023/a:1023940209581
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References found in this work BETA

Morals by Agreement.David Gauthier - 1986 - Oxford University Press.
An Essay on Free Will.Peter Van Inwagen - 1983 - Oxford University Press.
The Impossibility of Moral Responsibility.Galen J. Strawson - 1994 - Philosophical Studies 75 (1-2):5-24.

View all 38 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Farewell to the Luck (and Mind) Argument.Christopher Evan Franklin - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 156 (2):199-230.
Free Acts and Chance: Why The Rollback Argument Fails.Lara Buchak - 2013 - Philosophical Quarterly 63 (250):20-28.
Indirect Compatibilism.Andrew James Latham - 2019 - Dissertation, University of Sydney
Why Free Will Remains a Mystery.Seth Shabo - 2011 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 92 (1):105-125.

View all 21 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Why Free Will Remains a Mystery.Seth Shabo - 2011 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 92 (1):105-125.
Free Will Remains a Mystery.Peter van Inwagen - 2000 - Philosophical Perspectives 14:1-20.
The Mystery of Metaphysical Freedom.Peter van Inwagen - 1998 - In Peter van Inwagen & Dean W. Zimmerman (eds.), Van Inwagen, P.; Zimmerman, D. Metaphysics: The Big Questions. Blackwell. pp. 365-373.
Free Will.Kevin Timpe - 2006 - Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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