Free will, chance, and mystery

Philosophical Studies 113 (2):153-80 (2003)

Abstract

This paper proposes a reconciliation between libertarian freedomand causal indeterminism, without relying on agent-causation asa primitive notion. I closely examine Peter van Inwagen''s recentcase for free will mysterianism, which is based in part on thewidespread worry that undetermined acts are too chancy to befree. I distinguish three senses of the term chance I thenargue that van Inwagen''s case for free will mystrianism fails,since there is no single construal of the term change on whichall of the premises of his argument for free will–causalindeterminism incompatibilism are true. By use of a particularevent-causal indeterminist account of free action, I support thecase for free will–indeterminism compatibilism.

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Author's Profile

Laura Ekstrom
College of William and Mary

References found in this work

An Essay on Free Will.Peter Van Inwagen - 1983 - Oxford University Press.
Morals by Agreement.David P. Gauthier - 1986 - Oxford University Press.
The Significance of Free Will.Robert Kane - 1996 - Oxford University Press USA.
The Impossibility of Moral Responsibility.Galen J. Strawson - 1994 - Philosophical Studies 75 (1-2):5-24.

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Citations of this work

Farewell to the Luck (and Mind) Argument.Christopher Evan Franklin - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 156 (2):199-230.
Free Acts and Chance: Why The Rollback Argument Fails.Lara Buchak - 2013 - Philosophical Quarterly 63 (250):20-28.
Why Free Will Remains a Mystery.Seth Shabo - 2011 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 92 (1):105-125.
Indirect Compatibilism.Andrew James Latham - 2019 - Dissertation, University of Sydney
The Two‐Stage Luck Objection.Seth Shabo - 2020 - Noûs 54 (1):3-23.

View all 26 citations / Add more citations

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