Philosophical Studies 113 (2):153-80 (2003)
AbstractThis paper proposes a reconciliation between libertarian freedomand causal indeterminism, without relying on agent-causation asa primitive notion. I closely examine Peter van Inwagen''s recentcase for free will mysterianism, which is based in part on thewidespread worry that undetermined acts are too chancy to befree. I distinguish three senses of the term chance I thenargue that van Inwagen''s case for free will mystrianism fails,since there is no single construal of the term change on whichall of the premises of his argument for free will–causalindeterminism incompatibilism are true. By use of a particularevent-causal indeterminist account of free action, I support thecase for free will–indeterminism compatibilism.
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References found in this work
Persons and Causes: The Metaphysics of Free Will.Timothy O'Connor - 2000 - Oxford University Press USA.
The Impossibility of Moral Responsibility.Galen J. Strawson - 1994 - Philosophical Studies 75 (1-2):5-24.
Citations of this work
Farewell to the Luck (and Mind) Argument.Christopher Evan Franklin - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 156 (2):199-230.
Free Acts and Chance: Why The Rollback Argument Fails.Lara Buchak - 2013 - Philosophical Quarterly 63 (250):20-28.
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The Mystery of Metaphysical Freedom.Peter van Inwagen - 1998 - In Peter van Inwagen & Dean W. Zimmerman (eds.), Van Inwagen, P.; Zimmerman, D. Metaphysics: The Big Questions. Blackwell. pp. 365-373.
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