Von Wright on Historical causation1

In Explanation and Understanding von Wright argues that if, as he suggests, a practical inference schema is adopted as an explanation model for actions, then it follows that historical explanations are non?causal. My criticisms are principally directed against his version of the Logical Connection Argument which attempts to show that the verification of the action description to be explained and the verification of the intention description which explains it are interdependent. Von Wright blurs the important distinctions (1) between acting with an intention and acting intentionally; (2) between intention to perform an action and intention to bring about a consequence of it; and (3) between verification of intention descriptions in general and of a description of a specific intention. The ?conclusion? of his practical inference schema cannot be the appropriate historical explanandum and the explaining procedure that he suggests is shown to be ultimately circular.
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DOI 10.1080/00201747408601730
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References found in this work BETA
The Logical Connection Argument.Frederick M. Stoutland - 1970 - American Philosophical Quarterly.
Explanation and Understanding.Georg Henrik von Wright - 1973 - Philosophical Review 82 (3):380-388.

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