What makes a theory physically “complete”?

Foundations of Physics 23 (7):971-985 (1993)
Authors
Harvey R. Brown
Oxford University
Abstract
Three claims about what makes a theory “physically complete” are (1) Shimony's assertion that a complete theory says “all there is to say” about nature; (2) EPR's requirement that a complete theory describe all “elements of reality”; and (3) Ballentine and Jarrett's claim that a “predictively complete” theory must obey a condition used in Bell deviations. After introducing “statistical completeness” as a partial formalization of (1), we explore the logical and motivational relationships connecting these completeness conditions. We find that statistical completeness motivates but does not imply Jarrett's completeness condition, because Jarrett's condition encodes further intuitions about locality and causality. We also dispute Ballentine and Jarrett's claim that EPR-completeness implies Jarrett's completeness condition
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DOI 10.1007/BF00736011
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The Direction of Time.Hans Reichenbach - 1956 - Dover Publications.

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