Analysis 70 (2):212-215 (2010)

Peter Eldridge-Smith
Australian National University
The Pinocchio paradox, devised by Veronique Eldridge-Smith in February 2001, is a counter-example to solutions to the Liar that restrict the use or definition of semantic predicates. Pinocchio’s nose grows if and only if what he is stating is false, and Pinocchio says ‘My nose is growing’. In this statement, ‘is growing’ has its normal meaning and is not a semantic predicate. If Pinocchio’s nose is growing it is because he is saying something false; otherwise, it is not growing. ‘Because’ stands here for a non-semantic relation; it might be supposed to be causal or of some other nature, but it is not semantic. The paradox is discussed in relation to Tarski’s and Kripke’s theories of truth. Although the paradox is not necessarily a counter-example to a theory of a truth predicate, it is a problem for a theory of truth of the kind preserved by validity.
Keywords Paradox  Liar Paradox  Truth-teller  Tarski  Kripke  Theory of truth  Validity  Pinocchio paradox
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DOI 10.1093/analys/anp173
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References found in this work BETA

Outline of a Theory of Truth.Saul Kripke - 1975 - Journal of Philosophy 72 (19):690-716.
Arguing About Gods.Graham Oppy - 2006 - Cambridge University Press.
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Citations of this work BETA

Pinocchio Beards the Barber.Peter Eldridge-Smith - 2012 - Analysis 72 (4):749-752.
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Contradiction Club: Dialetheism and the Social World.Matthew J. Cull & Emma Bolton - 2019 - Journal of Social Ontology 5 (2):169-180.

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