What versus how in naturally selected representations

Mind 107 (426):349-363 (1998)
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Abstract

Empty judgements appear to be about something, and inaccurate judgements to report something. Naturalism tries to explain these appearances without positing non-real objects or states of affairs. Biological naturalism explains that the false and the empty are tokens which fail to perform the function proper to their biological type. But if truth is a biological 'supposed to', we should expect designs that achieve it only often enough. The sensory stimuli which trigger the frog's gulp-launching signal may be a poor guide to the signal's content. Teleosemantics should be anti-verificationist

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Citations of this work

Mental Causation versus Physical Causation: No Contest.Crawford L. Elder - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (1):111-127.
Mental causation versus physical causation: No contest.Crawford L. Elder - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (1):110-127.
What should a theory of vision look like?Anne Jaap Jacobson - 2008 - Philosophical Psychology 21 (5):585 – 599.
Ontology and realism about modality.Crawford L. Elder - 1999 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 77 (3):292 – 302.

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