Abstract
Thirty-five years ago the editor of a collection entitled Philosophy of Mind could plausibly claim that his selection of a dozen articles was representative of the wide range and vitality of contemporary inquiries. There was no need to categorize; he had chosen articles on the basis of merit, whether or not, in the aggregate, they encompassed the major problems or topics that are the special province of the philosophical study of mind. A 1991 text, on the other hand, offers five major categories, some requiring as many as four subdivisions—obviously in the interest of careful analysis. Yet it is not clear why, for example, “Consciousness, Self and Personhood” should constitute a subset of “The Nature of Mind,” when “Self and Other” occurs as a major category two hundred pages earlier. I am only pointing out the vicissitudes of classification, too little in one case, in the other seemingly too much of a good thing. With these and other collections in mind, one might well conclude that the subject matter of philosophy of mind is too diffuse to allow precise organization and definition.