Fragmentation and information access


Authors
Agustin Rayo
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Abstract
In order to predict and explain behavior, one cannot specify the mental state of an agent merely by saying what information she possesses.  Instead one must specify what information is available to an agent relative to various purposes.  Specifying mental states in this way allows us to accommodate cases of imperfect recall, cognitive accomplishments involved in logical deduction, the mental states of confused or fragmented subjects, and the difference between propositional knowledge and know-how
Keywords Mental fragmentation  Recall failure  Memory  Logical omniscience  Alief
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References found in this work BETA

Knowledge and Action.John Hawthorne & Jason Stanley - 2008 - Journal of Philosophy 105 (10):571-590.
[Letter From Gilbert Ryle].Gilbert Ryle - 1932 - Philosophy 7 (26):250 -.
Logic for Equivocators.David K. Lewis - 1982 - Noûs 16 (3):431-441.

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Citations of this work BETA

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Code Words in Political Discourse.Justin Khoo - 2017 - Philosophical Topics 45 (2):33-64.

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