Knowledge is closed under analytic content

Synthese 199 (1-2):5339-5353 (2021)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

I am concerned with epistemic closure—the phenomenon in which some knowledge requires other knowledge. In particular, I defend a version of the closure principle in terms of analyticity; if an agent S knows that p is true and that q is an analytic part of p, then S knows that q. After targeting the relevant notion of analyticity, I argue that this principle accommodates intuitive cases and possesses the theoretical resources to avoid the preface paradox.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 92,168

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

A strategy for assessing closure.Peter Murphy - 2006 - Erkenntnis 65 (3):365 - 383.
Sensitivity, Safety, and Closure.Sven Bernecker - 2012 - Acta Analytica 27 (4):367-381.
Dretske on knowledge closure.Steven Luper - 2006 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (3):379 – 394.
Knowledge-Closure and Inferential Knowledge.Guido Melchior - 2010 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 10 (3):259-285.
The epistemic closure principle.Steven Luper - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Knowledge and deductive closure.James L. White - 1991 - Synthese 86 (3):409 - 423.
Living without closure.Krista Lawlor - 2005 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 69 (1):25-50.

Analytics

Added to PP
2021-02-05

Downloads
32 (#501,769)

6 months
12 (#218,039)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Samuel Elgin
University of California, San Diego

References found in this work

Word and Object.Willard Van Orman Quine - 1960 - Cambridge, MA, USA: MIT Press.
Two Dogmas of Empiricism.W. Quine - 1951 - [Longmans, Green].
Knowledge and lotteries.John Hawthorne - 2004 - New York: Oxford University Press.
The meaning of 'meaning'.Hilary Putnam - 1975 - Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 7:131-193.
Two Dogmas of Empiricism.Willard V. O. Quine - 1951 - Philosophical Review 60 (1):20–43.

View all 79 references / Add more references