Analysis 80 (2):212-221 (2020)

Authors
Adam Elga
Princeton University
Abstract
Counter-intuitive consequences of both causal decision theory and evidential decision theory are dramatized. Each of those theories is thereby put under some pressure to supply an error theory to explain away intuitions that seem to favour the other. Because trouble is stirred up for both sides, complacency about Newcomb’s problem is discouraged.
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DOI 10.1093/analys/anz070
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References found in this work BETA

Reasons and Persons.Derek Parfit - 1984 - Oxford University Press.
The Logic of Decision.Richard C. Jeffrey - 1965 - University of Chicago Press.
What Do Philosophers Believe?David Bourget & David J. Chalmers - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 170 (3):465-500.
Reasons and Persons.Joseph Margolis - 1986 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 47 (2):311-327.

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