Philosophical Studies 123 (1-2):115-124 (2004)
When it comes to evaluating our own abilities and prospects, most people are subject to a distorting bias. We think that we are better – friendlier, more well-liked, better leaders, and better drivers – than we really are. Once we learn about this bias, we should ratchet down our self-evaluations to correct for it. But we don’t. That leaves us with an uncomfortable tension in our beliefs: we knowingly allow our beliefs to differ from the ones that we think are supported by our evidence. We can mitigate the tension by waffling between two belief states: a reflective state that has been recalibrated to take into account our tendency to overrate ourselves, and a non-reflective state that has not.
|Keywords||Philosophy Philosophy Epistemology Logic Philosophy of Mind Philosophy of Religion|
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References found in this work BETA
An Analysis of Self-Deception.Kent Bach - 1981 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 41 (March):351-370.
Self-Deception and the Nature of Mind.Mark Johnston - 1995 - In C. Macdonald (ed.), Philosophy of Psychology: Debates on Psychological Explanation. Cambridge: Blackwell. pp. 63--91.
Citations of this work BETA
The Conflict of Evidence and Coherence.Alex Worsnip - 2015 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 91 (2).
Self-Deception as Pretense.Gendler Tamar Szabó - 2007 - Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):231 - 258.
What's the Matter with Epistemic Circularity?David James Barnett - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 171 (2):177-205.
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