On overrating oneself... And knowing it

Philosophical Studies 123 (1-2):115-124 (2004)
Abstract
When it comes to evaluating our own abilities and prospects, most people are subject to a distorting bias. We think that we are better – friendlier, more well-liked, better leaders, and better drivers – than we really are. Once we learn about this bias, we should ratchet down our self-evaluations to correct for it. But we don’t. That leaves us with an uncomfortable tension in our beliefs: we knowingly allow our beliefs to differ from the ones that we think are supported by our evidence. We can mitigate the tension by waffling between two belief states: a reflective state that has been recalibrated to take into account our tendency to overrate ourselves, and a non-reflective state that has not.
Keywords Philosophy   Philosophy   Epistemology   Logic   Philosophy of Mind   Philosophy of Religion
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Reprint years 2005
DOI 10.1007/s11098-004-5222-1
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References found in this work BETA
A Treatise of Human Nature.David Hume - 1739/2000 - Oxford University Press.
Treatise on Human Nature.David Hume - 1739 - Oxford University Press.
An Analysis of Self-Deception.Kent Bach - 1981 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 41 (March):351-370.

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Citations of this work BETA
Moral Intuitionism and Disagreement.Brian Besong - 2014 - Synthese 191 (12):2767-2789.
The Conflict of Evidence and Coherence.Alex Worsnip - 2015 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 91 (2).
Self-Deception as Pretense.Gendler Tamar Szabó - 2007 - Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):231 - 258.
What's the Matter with Epistemic Circularity?David James Barnett - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 171 (2):177-205.
Aesthetic Testimony.Jon Robson - 2012 - Philosophy Compass 7 (1):1-10.

View all 9 citations / Add more citations

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Transparent Self-Knowledge.Matthew Boyle - 2011 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 85 (1):223-241.
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Who is Fooled?Donald Davidson - 2004 - In Problems of Rationality. Oxford University Press.
Intuitive and Reflective Beliefs.Dan Sperber - 1997 - Mind and Language 12 (1):67-83.

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