Synthese 197 (3):1149-1163 (2020)
AbstractAmong contemporary philosophers, there is widespread consensus that begging the question is a grave argumentative flaw. However, there is presently no satisfactory analysis of what this flaw consists of. Here, I defend a notion of question-begging in terms of analyticity. In particular, I argue that an argument begs the question just in case its conclusion is an analytic part of the conjunction of its premises.
Added to PP
Historical graph of downloads
References found in this work
Two Dogmas of Empiricism.W. V. O. Quine - 1951 - In Robert B. Talisse & Scott F. Aikin (eds.), The Pragmatism Reader: From Peirce Through the Present. Princeton University Press. pp. 202-220.
Citations of this work
A Puzzle About Epistemic Value and Steps Towards a Solution.Timothy Perrine - 2021 - Synthese 199 (5-6):12103-12119.
Similar books and articles
Statements of Inference and Begging the Question.Matthew McKeon - 2017 - Synthese 194 (6):1919-1943.
Question-Begging Under a Non-Foundational Model of Argument.Peter Suber - 1994 - Argumentation 8 (3):241-250.
Petitio Principii: What's Wrong?Andrea Iacona & Diego Marconi - 2005 - Facta Philosophica 7 (1):19-34.
Many Questions Begs the Question (but Questions Do Not Beg the Question).Dale Jacquette - 1994 - Argumentation 8 (3):283-289.
A Neglected Way of Begging the Question.Peter Kung & Masahiro Yamada - 2010 - American Philosophical Quarterly 47 (3):287.
Does the Consequence Argument Beg the Question?John Martin Fischer & Garrett Pendergraft - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 166 (3):575-595.
Begging the Question, Circularity and Epistemic Propriety.Dilip K. Basu - 1994 - Argumentation 8 (3):217-226.
Begging the Question.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 1999 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 77 (2):174 – 191.
Pathological Circularity: Deductive Validity and a Contextual Account of the Fallacy of Begging the Question.James G. Edwards - unknown