De Ethica 6 (1):75-91 (2020)

Bennett Gilbert
Portland State University
Natan Elgabsi
Åbo Akademi University
In this essay we consider the moral claims of one branch of non-realist theory known as linguistic narrativism theory. By highlighting the moral implications of linguistic narrativism theory, we argue that the “moral vision” expressed by this theory can entail, at worst, undesirable moral agnosticism if not related to a transcendental and supra-personal normativity in our moral life. With its appeal to volitionism and intuitionism, the ethical sensitivity of this theory enters into difficulties brought about by several internal tensions as to what morality and moral judgements involve. We contend that the proponents of linguistic narrativism theory must strongly recognize and take responsibility for the “moral vison” their theory professes, in so far as they want to think of their theory as a morally responsible one.
Keywords narrativism  moral responsibility  ethics  constructivism  moral intuitionism  moral volitionism  moral philosophy  moral vision
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