Subjective Probabilities Should be Sharp


Authors
Adam Elga
Princeton University
Abstract
Many have claimed that unspecific evidence sometimes demands unsharp, indeterminate, imprecise, vague, or interval-valued probabilities. Against this, a variant of the diachronic Dutch Book argument shows that perfectly rational agents always have perfectly sharp probabilities.
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Evidence: A Guide for the Uncertain.Kevin Dorst - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
Rational Reflection.David Christensen - 2010 - Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):121-140.

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