Subjective Probabilities Should be Sharp

Philosophers' Imprint 10 (2010)
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Abstract

Many have claimed that unspecific evidence sometimes demands unsharp, indeterminate, imprecise, vague, or interval-valued probabilities. Against this, a variant of the diachronic Dutch Book argument shows that perfectly rational agents always have perfectly sharp probabilities.

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Adam Elga
Princeton University

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