Subjective Probabilities Should be Sharp
Philosophers' Imprint 10 (2010)
| Authors |
Adam Elga
Princeton University
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| Abstract |
Many have claimed that unspecific evidence sometimes demands unsharp, indeterminate, imprecise, vague, or interval-valued probabilities. Against this, a variant of the diachronic Dutch Book argument shows that perfectly rational agents always have perfectly sharp probabilities.
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Citations of this work BETA
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Dr. Truthlove Or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love Bayesian Probabilities.Kenny Easwaran - 2016 - Noûs 50 (4):816-853.
A Defense of Imprecise Credences in Inference and Decision Making1.James M. Joyce - 2010 - Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):281-323.
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