Samuel Elgin
University of California, San Diego
I provide an analysis of sentences of the form ‘To be F is to be G’ in terms of exact truth-maker semantics—an approach that identifies the meanings of sentences with the states of the world directly responsible for their truth-values. Roughly, I argue that these sentences hold just in case that which makes something F is that which makes it G. This approach is hyperintensional, and possesses desirable logical and modal features. These sentences are reflexive, transitive and symmetric, and, if they are true, then they are necessarily true, and it is necessary that all and only Fs are Gs. I close by defining an asymmetric and irreflexive notion of analysis in terms of the reflexive and symmetric one.
Keywords Generalized Identities  Analysis  Real Definition  To be F is to be G  Truth-Maker Semantics
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References found in this work BETA

Modal Logic as Metaphysics.Timothy Williamson - 2013 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
Ethics Without Principles.Jonathan Dancy - 2004 - Oxford University Press.
The Nature of Necessity.Alvin Plantinga - 1974 - Oxford, England: Clarendon Press.
Situations and Attitudes.Jon Barwise & John Perry - 1981 - Journal of Philosophy 78 (11):668-691.

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Citations of this work BETA

The Power to Govern.Erica Shumener - forthcoming - Philosophical Perspectives.
Physicalism and the Identity of Identity Theories.Samuel Z. Elgin - 2020 - Annalen der Philosophie 87 (1):161-180.

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