Journal of Consciousness Studies 2 (4):353-58 (1995)
Moody's thought-experiment invoking zombies to demonstrate the uniqueness of consciousness is commended. His conclusions accord well with previous ones arrived at by Penrose, Chalmers and myself. All these works lead to a disturbing conclusion: onsciousness, as something distinct from the brain processes, interferes with physical reality. Ergo, it is no longer possible to adhere to any of the modern theories of mind that preserve the completeness of physics. This conclusion is, in principle, testable
|Keywords||Consciousness Metaphysics Science Zombie Moody, T|
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Zombies, Epiphenomenalism, and Physicalist Theories of Consciousness.Andrew R. Bailey - 2006 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 36 (4):481-509.
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