How Neurons Mean: A Neurocomputational Theory of Representational Content

Dissertation, Washington University (2000)
Questions concerning representations and what they are about have been a staple of Western philosophy since Aristotle. Recently, however, these same questions have begun to concern neuroscientists, who have developed new techniques and theories for understanding how the locus of representation, the brain, operates. My dissertation draws on philosophy and neuroscience to develop a novel theory of representational content. ;I begin by identifying what I call the problem of "neurosemantics" . This, I argue, is simply an updated version of a problem historically addressed by philosophers. I outline three kinds of contemporary theory of representational content and discuss difficulties with each. I suggest that discovering a single factor that provides a unified explanation of the independent aspects of meaning will provide a means of avoiding the difficulties faced by current theories. My central purpose is to articulate and defend such a factor. ;Before describing the factor itself, I provide the necessary background for evaluating a solution to the problem of neurosemantics. My analysis results in thirteen questions about representation. I also provide a methodological critique of the traditional approach to answering these questions and argue for an alternative approach. I discuss evidence that suggests that this alternative provides a better means of characterizing representation. ;After having established the nature of the problem and a preferred methodology, I briefly describe my theory of content. I then outline a neurobiologically motivated theory of neural computation that I and others have helped Charles H. Anderson develop. I show how to mathematically define the relations relevant to understanding representational content at various levels of analysis. I show how this theory can be made philosophically respectable and integrated with the theory outlined earlier. I then answer each of the thirteen questions about representation. ;In conclusion, I defend this theory from potential philosophical criticisms. This defense includes an explication of how concepts are to be accounted for on this theory and a consideration of the problem of misrepresentation. I also show how this theory is immune to standard critiques of each of causal, conceptual role, and two-factor theories of content
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 35,829
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Representational Content in Humans and Machines.Mark H. Bickhard - 1993 - Journal of Experimental and Theoretical Artificial Intelligence 5:285-33.
Psychological Ecology.Lee Anderson Basham - 1998 - Dissertation, The University of Oklahoma
Expression in the Representational Arts.Catharine Abell - 2013 - American Philosophical Quarterly 50 (1):23-36.
The Representational Theory of Consciousness.David Bourget - 2010 - Dissertation, Australian National University
The Reference of de Re Representations.Frank Hofmann - 2001 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 62 (1):83-101.
Computational Models: A Modest Role for Content.Frances Egan - 2010 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 41 (3):253-259.


Added to PP index

Total downloads
1 ( #1,078,661 of 2,293,780 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #411,043 of 2,293,780 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads

Sorry, there are not enough data points to plot this chart.

My notes

Sign in to use this feature