Canadian Journal of Philosophy 44 (3-4):425-442 (2014)

Authors
E. Sonny Elizondo
University of California at Santa Barbara
Abstract
According to rationalist conceptions of moral agency, the constitutive capacities of moral agency are rational capacities. So understood, rationalists are often thought to have a problem with feeling. For example, many believe that rationalists must reject the attractive Aristotelian thought that moral activity is by nature pleasant. I disagree. It is easy to go wrong here because it is easy to assume that pleasure is empirical rather than rational and so extrinsic rather than intrinsic to moral agency, rationalistically conceived. Drawing on underappreciated elements of Kant’s moral psychology, I sketch an alternative form of rationalism, according to which moral activity is by nature pleasant because at least some pleasures are by nature rational.
Keywords Kant  Rationalism  Moral Agency  Feeling  Pleasure
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Reprint years 2014
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DOI 10.1080/00455091.2014.959360
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References found in this work BETA

What We Owe to Each Other.Thomas Scanlon - 1998 - Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals.Immanuel Kant - 1785/2002 - Oxford University Press.
The Sources of Normativity.Christine M. Korsgaard - 1996 - Cambridge University Press.
The Possibility of Altruism.Thomas Nagel - 1970 - Oxford Clarendon Press.
Critique of Practical Reason.Immanuel Kant - 1788 - Hackett Publishing Company.

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Citations of this work BETA

A System of Rational Faculties: Additive or Transformative?Karl Schafer - forthcoming - European Journal of Philosophy.
Morality is its Own Reward.E. Sonny Elizondo - 2016 - Kantian Review 21 (3):343-365.

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