A Historically Informed Defence of the Multiple-Relation Theory of Judgment [review of Samuel Lebens, Bertrand Russell and the Nature of Propositions: a History and Defense of the Multiple Relation Theory of Judgement]

Authors
Landon D. C. Elkind
University of Iowa
Abstract
Book Review: Samuel Lebens (2017) "Bertrand Russell and the Nature of Propositions: a History and Defense of the Multiple Relation Theory of Judgement"
Keywords Propositions  Russell  Judgment  History of Analytic Philosophy
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DOI 10.15173/russell.v38i1.3645
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