Logos and Episteme 8 (3):359-363 (2017)

Landon D. C. Elkind
University of Alberta
I critically discuss a new proposal for a metaphysics of sense-data. This proposal is due to Peter Forrest. Forrest argues that, if we accept Platonism about universals, sense-data are best understood as structured universals–in particular, as structured universals with temporal and spatial properties as components. Against this proposal, I argue sense-data as structured universals are not universals at all.
Keywords Analytic Philosophy  Contemporary Philosophy  Philosophy of Mind
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ISBN(s) 2069-0533
DOI 10.5840/logos-episteme20178327
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Universals as Sense-Data.Peter Forrest - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (3):622 - 631.

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