Noûs 52 (2):260-278 (2018)

Authors
Gregory Wheeler
Frankfurt School Of Finance And Management
Lee Elkin
Jagiellonian University
Abstract
Two compelling principles, the Reasonable Range Principle and the Preservation of Irrelevant Evidence Principle, are necessary conditions that any response to peer disagreements ought to abide by. The Reasonable Range Principle maintains that a resolution to a peer disagreement should not fall outside the range of views expressed by the peers in their dispute, whereas the Preservation of Irrelevant Evidence Principle maintains that a resolution strategy should be able to preserve unanimous judgments of evidential irrelevance among the peers. No standard Bayesian resolution strategy satisfies the PIE Principle, however, and we give a loss aversion argument in support of PIE and against Bayes. The theory of imprecise probability allows one to satisfy both principles, and we introduce the notion of a set-based credal judgment to frame and address a range of subtle issues that arise in peer disagreements.
Keywords Epistemology of disagreement  imprecise probability
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Reprint years 2018
DOI 10.1111/nous.12143
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References found in this work BETA

Epistemology of Disagreement: The Good News.David Christensen - 2007 - Philosophical Review 116 (2):187-217.
Higher‐Order Evidence and the Limits of Defeat.Maria Lasonen-Aarnio - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (2):314-345.
Peer Disagreement and Higher Order Evidence.Thomas Kelly - 2010 - In Alvin I. Goldman & Dennis Whitcomb (eds.), Social Epistemology: Essential Readings. Oxford University Press. pp. 183--217.
Reflection and Disagreement.Adam Elga - 2007 - Noûs 41 (3):478–502.

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Citations of this work BETA

Imprecise Probabilities.Seamus Bradley - 2019 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
IP Scoring Rules: Foundations and Applications.Jason Konek - 2019 - Proceedings of Machine Learning Research 103:256-264.
On the Accuracy of Group Credences.Richard Pettigrew - 2020 - Oxford Studies in Epistemology 6.
Persistent Disagreement and Polarization in a Bayesian Setting.Michael Nielsen & Rush T. Stewart - forthcoming - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science:axy056.

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