Content externalism and phenomenal character: A new worry about privileged access

Synthese 159 (1):47 - 60 (2007)
Abstract
A central question in contemporary epistemology concerns whether content externalism threatens a common doctrine about privileged access. If the contents of a subject
Keywords Privileged access  Qualia  Self-knowledge  Introspection  Phenomenal character  Phenomenal quality  First-person authority  Externalism  Phenomenal concept
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DOI 10.1007/s11229-006-9067-3
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References found in this work BETA
Fact, Fiction, and Forecast.Nelson Goodman - 1955 - Harvard University Press.
The Meaning of 'Meaning'.Hilary Putnam - 1975 - Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 7:131-193.
Individualism and the Mental.Tyler Burge - 1979 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 4 (1):73-122.

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Citations of this work BETA
Phenomenal Character, Phenomenal Concepts, and Externalism.Jonathan Ellis - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 147 (2):273 - 299.

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