Dialectica 60 (2):171-179 (2006)

Jonathan Ellis
University of California, Santa Cruz
Error theorists about color argue that our ordinary judgments ascribing color to material objects are all false. The error theorist proposes that everything that is so, including the fact that material objects appear to us to have color, can best be explained without ever attributing color to objects (for instance, by appealing to surface reflectance properties, the nature of light, the neurophysiology of perceivers, etc.). The appeal of this view stems in significant part from the prevalent thought that such explanations are strongly suggested by our present scientific conception of the world. Recently, however, Barry Stroud has argued that error theorists cannot successfully even acknowledge, let alone explain, all of the facts that error theorists must acknowledge. In this paper, I shall raise an objection to Stroud's argument. I shall conclude by mentioning one way in which we might develop Stroud's general strategy with more success.
Keywords Belief  Color  Error  Explanation  Metaphysics  Stroud, Barry
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DOI 10.1111/j.1746-8361.2005.01047.x
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Perception: A Representative Theory.Frank Jackson - 1977 - Cambridge University Press.
Problems From Locke.J. L. Mackie - 1976 - Clarendon Press.

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