Don’t Stop Believing (Hold onto That Warm Fuzzy Feeling)

Ethics 132 (1):4-37 (2021)
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Abstract

If beliefs are a map by which we steer, then, ceteris paribus, we should want a more accurate map. However, the world could be structured so as to punish learning with respect to certain topics—by learning new information, one’s situation could be worse than it otherwise would have been. We investigate whether the world is structured so as to punish learning specifically about moral nihilism. We ask, if an ordinary person had the option to learn the truth about moral nihilism, ought she to take it? We argue, given plausible assumptions about ordinary human preferences, she should not.

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Author Profiles

Jessica Isserow
University of Leeds
Edward J. R. Elliott
University of Leeds

Citations of this work

Revolutionary Normative Subjectivism.Lewis Williams - forthcoming - Australasian Journal of Philosophy.
Moral Nihilism—So What?Lewis Williams - 2023 - Ethics 134 (1):108-121.

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