Eliminating the Physical

Oxford Philosophical Society Review 36:23-27 (2014)
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If we reject physicalism, for the reasons given in my 2011 book ‘Panpsychism,’ we can arrive at a variant of idealism that accepts the concrete existence of all entities discoverable by science, but argues that these are nothing over and above centres of experience that can perceive one another and act on their percepts. In this metaphysical system, all physical properties and laws reduce without remainder to mental dittos – length is used in this paper as an example. Adopting this position resolves many difficulties in the philosophy of mind, including the problems of: the explanatory gap, mental causation, perception, qualia and zombies.



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