How values in scientific discovery and pursuit Alter theory appraisal

Philosophy of Science 76 (5):598-611 (2009)

Authors
Kevin Elliott
University of Newcastle
Abstract
Philosophers of science readily acknowledge that nonepistemic values influence the discovery and pursuit of scientific theories, but many tend to regard these influences as epistemically uninteresting. The present paper challenges this position by identifying three avenues through which nonepistemic values associated with discovery and pursuit in contemporary pollution research influence theory appraisal: (1) by guiding the choice of questions and research projects, (2) by altering experimental design, and (3) by affecting the creation and further investigation of theories or hypotheses. This analysis indicates that the effects of these values are sufficiently complex and epistemically significant to merit further attention. †To contact the authors, please write to: Kevin Elliott, Department of Philosophy, University of South Carolina, Columbia, SC 29208; e‐mail: ke@sc.edu . Daniel McKaughan, Department of Philosophy, Boston College, Chestnut Hill, MA 02467; e‐mail: daniel.mckaughan@bc.edu.
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DOI 10.1086/605807
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References found in this work BETA

Gender and the Biological Sciences.Kathleen Okruhlik - 1994 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 24 (sup1):21-42.
A New Program for Philosophy of Science?Ronald N. Giere - 2003 - Philosophy of Science 70 (1):15-21.
Error as Means to Discovery.Kevin Elliott - 2004 - Philosophy of Science 71 (2):174-197.

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Citations of this work BETA

A New Direction for Science and Values.Daniel Hicks - 2014 - Synthese 191 (14):3271-95.
The Irreducibility of Value-Freedom to Theory Assessment.Anke Bueter - 2015 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 49:18-26.

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