Studi Kantiani:141-158 (2020)

Addison Ellis
University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign
Sebastian Rödl’s 2018 book articulates and unfolds the thought that judgment’s self-consciousness is identical with its objectivity. This view is laid forth in a Hegelian spirit, against the spirit of Kant’s merely formal or transcendental idealism. I review Rödl’s central theses and then offer a criticism of his reading of Kant. I hold that we can agree with Rödl that self-consciousness is identical with objectivity (though only in a ‘formal’ sense). We can also agree with Rödl that this identity enables us to see the completeness and the incompleteness of judgment as two sides of one coin. And, it is not necessary to reject the formality or ‘emptiness’ of Kant’s ‘I think’ in order to establish these points. Indeed, the virtues of these theses flows directly from such notions in Kant. And, because Rödl need not reject the central features of Kant’s formal idealism, he also need not locate them as the source of the need for a turn to Hegel.
Keywords Kant  Self-consciousness  Objectivity  Hegel
Categories (categorize this paper)
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

 PhilArchive page | Other versions
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Self-Consciousness and Knowledge.Sebastian Rödl - 2013 - In Margit Ruffing, Claudio La Rocca, Alfredo Ferrarin & Stefano Bacin (eds.), Kant Und Die Philosophie in Weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des Xi. Kant-Kongresses 2010. De Gruyter. pp. 357-370.
Kant and the Demands of Self-Consciousness. [REVIEW]Frederick Rauscher - 2000 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 38 (2):285.
Self-Consciousness, Objectivity, and Time.Gal Yehezkel - 2008 - Metaphilosophy 39 (4-5):591-611.
Hegel's Break with Kant: The Leap From Individual Psychology to Sociology.John Hund - 1998 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 28 (2):226-243.


Added to PP index

Total views
178 ( #65,729 of 2,504,603 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
105 ( #6,896 of 2,504,603 )

How can I increase my downloads?


My notes