On conventionality and simultaneity - a reply

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 49 (2):177 – 203 (1971)
This paper is a response to the "panel discussion of simultaneity by slow clock transport in the special and general theories of relativity" ("philosophy of science", 36, (march, 1969), Pp. 1-81) which arose out of a paper by brian ellis and peter bowman on "conventionality in distant simultaneity", ("philosophy of science", 34, (june, 1967), Pp. 116-36). It is argued that the basic disagreement between the pittsburgh panel and us is an epistemological one. In particular, Our concept of a good physical reason is radically different from the pittsburgh panel's. For us the known existence of a number of concordant, Isotropic, And logically independent criteria for distant simultaneity, And the non-Existence of any known discordant but isotropic criteria for distant simultaneity is a good physical reason for choosing one of these criteria. For the pittsburgh panel it is not
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DOI 10.1080/00048407112341201
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References found in this work BETA
Brian Ellis (1969). Basic Concepts of Measurement. Journal of Symbolic Logic 34 (2):310-311.
Brian Ellis (1963). Universal and Differential Forces. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 14 (55):177-194.

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