Rationalization in the pejorative sense: Cushman's account overlooks the scope and costs of rationalization

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 43 (2020)
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Abstract

According to Cushman, rationalization occurs when a person has performed an action and then concocts beliefs and desires that would have made it rational. We argue that this isn't the paradigmatic form of rationalization. Consequently, Cushman's explanation of the function and usefulness of rationalization is less broad-reaching than he intends. Cushman's account also obscures some of rationalization's pernicious consequences.

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2020-04-16

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Author Profiles

Jonathan Ellis
University of California, Santa Cruz
Eric Schwitzgebel
University of California, Riverside

References found in this work

The Epistemic Innocence of Motivated Delusions.Lisa Bortolotti - 2015 - Consciousness and Cognition (33):490-499.

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