Abstract

William Godfrey-Smith is now William Grey. It is agreed that the moral community can be justifiably extended to include sentient non-humans, however, it is claimed that it is possible to give up human chauvinism without adopting the ethic Godfrey-Smith advocates. Feinberg's interest principle is taken by Godfrey-Smith to be the most promising for demarcating the class of individuals to whom rights can be properly attributed. It is claimed that this principle does not force an extension of the class of rights-holders beyond the class of sentient individuals, as claimed by Godfrey-Smith, to include individual trees, rainforests, soils and whole species. The crucial difference, it is claimed, is that sentient individuals but not plants are the subjects of experience. It is claimed that Godfrey-Smith has not provided sufficient argument to force an extension of the class of right-bearers in the way he advocates. Godfrey-Smith opposes the view that all values are grounded in human interest and concern, however, it is not necessary to accept his conclusion in order to argue against this position. Finally, it is not clear that he has produced an argument that shows there is no dependence between value and valuers analogous to the dependence between, say, lies and liars.