Authors
Edward J. R. Elliott
University of Leeds
Abstract
According to comparativism, comparative confidence is more fundamental than absolute confidence. In a pair of recent papers, Stefánsson has argued that comparativism is capable of explaining interpersonal confidence comparisons. In this paper, I will argue that Stefansson’s proposed explanation is inadequate; that we have good reasons to think that comparativism cannot handle interpersonal comparisons; and that the best explanation of interpersonal comparisons requires thinking about confidence in a fundamentally different way than that which comparativists propose—specifically, we should think of confidence as a dimensionless quantity.
Keywords comparativism  confidence  interpersonal comparisons  degrees of belief  measurement
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References found in this work BETA

Risk and Rationality.Lara Buchak - 2013 - Oxford University Press.
What Are Degrees of Belief.Lina Eriksson & Alan Hájek - 2007 - Studia Logica 86 (2):185-215.
Absolutism Vs Comparativism About Quantity.Shamik Dasgupta - 2013 - Oxford Studies in Metaphysics 8:105-150.
What is "Real" in Probabilism?H. Orri Stefánsson - 2017 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 95 (3):573-587.

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