Authors
Louis Loeb
University of Michigan, Ann Arbor
Abstract
Hume’s claim that a state is a belief is often intertwined---though without his remarking on this fact---with epistemic approval of the state. This requires explanation. Beliefs, in Hume’s view, are steady dispositions, nature’s provision for a steady influence on the will and action. Hume’s epistemic distinctions call attention to circumstances in which the presence of conflicting beliefs undermine a belief’s influence and thereby its natural function. On one version of this interpretation, to say that a belief is justified, ceteris paribus, is to say that for all that has been shown the belief would be steady in its influence under suitable reflection. On a second version, it is to say that prima facie justification is an intrinsic property of the state, in virtue of its steadiness. These versions generate different understandings of the relationship between Parts iii and iv of Book I of the Treatise.
Keywords Analytic Philosophy  Contemporary Philosophy  Philosophy of Mind
Categories (categorize this paper)
ISBN(s) 0031-8205
DOI ppr200163281
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 70,008
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Integrating Hume’s Accounts of Belief and Justification.Louis E. Loeb - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (2):279-303.
Integrating Hume’s Accounts of Belief and Justification.Louis E. Loeb - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (2):279-303.
Does Hume Hold a Dispositional Account of Belief?Jennifer Smalligan Marušić - 2010 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 40 (2):155-183.
Hume's Beliefs.Kaveh Kamooneh - 2003 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 11 (1):41 – 56.
Hume’s Epistemic Naturalism in the Treatise.Tim Black - 2011 - Hume Studies 37 (2):211-242.
Uma teoria naturalista da justificação das crenças na epistemologia de David Hume.Claudiney José de Souza - 2014 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 18 (2):227.
Hume's Theory of Belief.Michael M. Gorman - 1993 - Hume Studies 19 (1):89-101.
Nature and Natural Belief in Hume's Science of the Mind.Kenneth Aaron Richman - 1997 - Dissertation, Rutgers the State University of New Jersey - New Brunswick
Hume and Justified Belief.Michael J. Costa - 1981 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 11 (2):219 - 228.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2017-02-16

Total views
4 ( #1,277,670 of 2,505,203 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #416,705 of 2,505,203 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes