Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (1):474-500 (2017)

Authors
Andreas Elpidorou
University of Louisville
Abstract
Introspection presents our phenomenal states in a manner otherwise than physical. This observation is often thought to amount to an argument against physicalism: if introspection presents phenomenal states as they essentially are, then phenomenal states cannot be physical states, for we are not introspectively aware of phenomenal states as physical states. In this article, I examine whether this argument threatens a posteriori physicalism. I argue that as along as proponents of a posteriori physicalism maintain that phenomenal concepts present the nature of their referents in a partial and incomplete manner, a posteriori physicalism is safe.
Keywords physicalism  introspection  phenomenal concepts
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DOI 10.1111/papq.12068
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References found in this work BETA

Themes From Kaplan.Joseph Almog, John Perry & Howard Wettstein (eds.) - 1989 - Oxford University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Revelation and Physicalism.Kelly Trogdon - 2017 - Synthese 194 (7):2345-2366.
Revelation and Phenomenal Relations.Antonin Broi - 2020 - Philosophical Quarterly 70 (278):22-42.

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