The “New Mind” revisited, or minding the content/vehicle distinction: a response to Manzotti and Pepperell

AI and Society 28 (4):461-466 (2013)
I argue that Manzotti and Pepperell’s presentation of the New Mind not only obfuscates pertinent differences between externalist views of various strengths, but also, and most problematically, conflates a distinction that cannot, without consequences, be conflated. We can talk about the contents of the mind and/or about the vehicles of those contents. But we should not conflate the two. Conflation of contents and vehicles comes with a price. In Manzotti and Pepperell’s case, it undermines claims they make about the implications of the New Mind
Keywords Extended mind  Externalism  Consciousness  Content  Vehicles
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DOI 10.1007/s00146-013-0454-2
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The Extended Mind.Andy Clark & David J. Chalmers - 1998 - Analysis 58 (1):7-19.

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