Borderline Cases and the Collapsing Principle

Utilitas 26 (1):51-60 (2014)
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Abstract

John Broome has argued that value incommensurability is vagueness, by appeal to a controversial about comparative indeterminacy. I offer a new counterexample to the collapsing principle. That principle allows us to derive an outright contradiction from the claim that some object is a borderline case of some predicate. But if there are no borderline cases, then the principle is empty. The collapsing principle is either false or empty

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Author's Profile

Luke Elson
University of Reading

References found in this work

Vagueness, truth and logic.Kit Fine - 1975 - Synthese 30 (3-4):265-300.
The possibility of parity.Ruth Chang - 2002 - Ethics 112 (4):659-688.
Theories of Vagueness.Rosanna Keefe - 2003 - Philosophical Quarterly 53 (212):460-462.

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