Can Streumer simply avoid supervenience?

Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 16 (3):259-267 (2019)
  Copy   BIBTEX


In his defence of an error theory for normative judgements, Bart Streumer presents a new 'reduction' argument against nonreductive normative realism. Streumer claims that unlike previous versions, his 'simple moral theory' version of the argument doesn’t rely on the supervenience of the normative on the descriptive. But this is incorrect; without supervenience the argument does not succeed.


Added to PP

421 (#50,940)

6 months
131 (#37,253)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Luke Elson
University of Reading

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Metaphysics Without Conceptual Analysis.Robert Stalnaker - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (3):631-636.
The Supervenience Challenge to Non-Naturalism.Pekka Väyrynen - 2017 - In Tristram Colin McPherson & David Plunkett (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Metaethics. New York: Routledge. pp. 170-84.
Supervenience Arguments and Normative Non‐naturalism.Billy Dunaway - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 91 (3):627-655.

Add more references