Propositional anaphors

Philosophical Studies 176 (4):1055-1075 (2019)
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Propositions are posited to perform a variety of explanatory roles. One important role is being what is designated by a dedicated linguistic expression like a "that"-clause. In this paper, the case that propositions are needed for such a role is bolstered by defending that there are other expressions dedicated to designating propositions. In particular, it is shown that natural language has anaphors for propositions. Complement "so" and the response markers "yes" and "no" are argued to be such expressions.



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Peter van Elswyk
Northwestern University

Citations of this work

Assertion Remains Strong.Peter van Elswyk & Matthew A. Benton - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-24.
The Dynamics of Argumentative Discourse.Carlotta Pavese & Alexander W. Kocurek - 2022 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 51 (2):413-456.
Metalinguistic Apophaticism.Peter van Elswyk - forthcoming - Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion.
"That"-Clauses and Propositional Anaphors.Peter van Elswyk - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (10):2861-2875.

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References found in this work

Knowledge and Practical Interests.Jason Stanley - 2005 - Oxford University Press.
The Nature and Structure of Content.Jeffrey C. King - 2007 - New York, NY, USA: Oxford University Press.
Relativism and Monadic Truth.Herman Cappelen & John Hawthorne - 2009 - Oxford University Press UK.

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