Counterfactuals without Possible Worlds? A Difficulty for Fine’s Exact Semantics for Counterfactuals

Journal of Philosophy (5):276-287 (2014)
Brian Embry
University of Groningen
In this paper I argue that there is a difficulty for Fine's exact semantics for counterfactuals. The difficulty undermines Fine's reasons for preferring exact semantics to possible worlds semantics.
Keywords Counterfactuals  Possible Worlds  Semantics  Truthmaker
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DOI 10.5840/jphil2014111522
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