Authors
Nina Emery
Mount Holyoke College
Abstract
I argue against the common and influential view that non-trivial chances arise only when the fundamental laws are indeterministic. The problem with this view, I claim, is not that it conflicts with some antecedently plausible metaphysics of chance or that it fails to capture our everyday use of ‘chance’ and related terms, but rather that it is unstable. Any reason for adopting the position that non-trivial chances arise only when the fundamental laws are indeterministic is also a reason for adopting a much stronger, and far less attractive, position. I suggest an alternative account, according to which chances are probabilities that play a certain explanatory role: they are probabilities that explain associated frequencies.
Keywords Chance  Determinism
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DOI 10.1093/bjps/axt041
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References found in this work BETA

Laws and Symmetry.Bas C. van Fraassen - 1989 - Oxford University Press.
Mental Causation.Stephen Yablo - 1992 - Philosophical Review 101 (2):245-280.

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Citations of this work BETA

Laws and Their Instances.Nina Emery - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (6):1535-1561.
The Metaphysical Consequences of Counterfactual Skepticism.Nina Emery - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 94 (2):399-432.
How to Know That Time Travel Is Unlikely Without Knowing Why.Katrina Elliott - 2019 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 100 (1):90-113.

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