Nina Emery
Mount Holyoke College
I argue that the way the world appears to be plays an important role in standard scientific practice, and that therefore the way the world appears to be ought to play a similar role in metaphysics as well. I then show how the argument bears on a specific first-order debate in metaphysics—the debate over whether there are composite objects. This debate is often thought to be a paradigm case of a metaphysical debate that is largely insulated from scientific considerations, and is often disparaged or avoided by naturalistically-inclined metaphysicians as a result. My argument below shows that this attitude is a mistake. The way in which metaphysical debates can be informed by our best science is more complex and far-reaching than is often acknowledged in the literature.
Keywords Common sense  Composition  Metametaphysics
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References found in this work BETA

On the Plurality of Worlds.David Lewis - 1986 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 178 (3):388-390.
The Skeptic and the Dogmatist.James Pryor - 2000 - Noûs 34 (4):517–549.
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Against Parthood.Theodore Sider - 2013 - Oxford Studies in Metaphysics 8:237–293.

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