Philosophical Studies 128 (2):441 - 477 (2006)
Abstract |
The hoary philosophical tradition of hedonism – the view that pleasure is the basic ethical or normative value – suggests that it is at least reasonably and roughly intuitive. But philosophers no longer treat hedonism that way. For the most part, they think that they know it to be obviously false on intuitive grounds, much more obviously false on such grounds than familiar competitors. I argue that this consensus is wrong. I defend the intuitive cogency of hedonism relative to the dominant desire-based and objectivist conceptions of well-being and the good. I argue that hedonism is still a contender, and indeed that our current understanding of commonsense intuition on balance supports it.
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Keywords | Philosophy Philosophy Epistemology Logic Philosophy of Mind Philosophy of Religion |
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ISBN(s) | |
DOI | 10.1007/s11098-006-1732-3 |
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Hedonism.Chris Heathwood - 2013 - In Hugh LaFollette (ed.), The International Encyclopedia of Ethics. Wiley.
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