Legal Theory 7 (1):377--83 (2001)

Authors
Timothy Endicott
Oxford University
Abstract
In fact, law is necessarily very vague. So if vagueness is a problem for legal theory, it is a serious problem. The problem has to do with the ideal of the rule of law and with the very idea of law: if vague standards provide no guidance in some cases, how can the life of a community be ruled by law? The problem has long concerned philosophers of law; the papers at this symposium address it afresh by asking what legal theory may have to learn from (or contribute to) work on vagueness in philosophy of language and philosophy of logic. Here I will not try to state the implications of vagueness for philosophy of law; I will try to set the stage by showing that vagueness is both an important and an unavoidable feature of law.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1017/S135232520170403X
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 58,374
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Rule Consequentialism and Disasters.Leonard Kahn - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 162 (2):219-236.
“Weasel Words” in Legal and Diplomatic Discourse: Vague Nouns and Phrases in UN Resolutions Relating to the Second Gulf War.Giuseppina Scotto di Carlo - 2015 - International Journal for the Semiotics of Law - Revue Internationale de Sémiotique Juridique 28 (3):559-576.

View all 9 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP index
2011-07-24

Total views
90 ( #112,584 of 2,420,347 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
5 ( #152,337 of 2,420,347 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes