Philosophical Topics 35 (1&2):217-240 (2007)
Inspired by recent theories of embodied cognition that emphasize matters of a mind's engineering realization, I introduce "nomic-role nonreductionism" as an alternative to traditional causal-role functionalism in the philosophy of mind. Rather than identify mental properties by a theory that describes their intra-level causal roles via types of inputs, internal states, and outputs, I suggest that one identify mental properties by a more comprehensive theory that also describes inter-level realization roles via types of lower-level engineering, internal mental states, and still higher-level states generated by them. I defend this position on grounds that mental properties should be understood by our best scientific theories, which at present include informatioin about mental engineering. I further defend this claim by a "parity of reasons" argument. Causal-role functionalists are justified to include sensory stimuli in their theory of mind as opposed to, say, the remote causes of sensory stimuli because the former but not the latter are items of direct mental production. But ditto for the system's physical realizations. They too directly produce mental states, only not by "causing" them but by "realizing" them. Engineering realizations and their input triggering conditions work in tandem. In addition, I tell a related but more general metaphysical story about property identity, namely, that the traditional causal theory should be replaced by a more comprehensive nomic theory that individuates properties by their intra-level causal powers as well as their inter-level realization capacities.
|Keywords||nature of mind expansion on functionalism nomic theory of properties|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Flat Versus Dimensioned: The What and the How of Functional Realization.Ronald P. Endicott - 2011 - Journal of Philosophical Research 36:191-208.
Functionalism, Superduperfunctionalism, and Physicalism: Lessons From Supervenience.Ronald P. Endicott - 2016 - Synthese 193 (7).
Similar books and articles
Identifying Mental States: A Celebrated Hypothesis Refuted.Irwin Goldstein - 1994 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 72 (1):46-62.
Making the Change: The Functionalist's Way.Paul Noordhof - 1997 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 48 (2):233-50.
Levels, Orders and the Causal Status of Mental Properties.Simone Gozzano - 2009 - European Journal of Philosophy 17 (3):347-362.
Functionalism and the Metaphysics of Causal Exclusion.David Yates - 2012 - Philosophers' Imprint 12 (13):1-25.
The Nomic Role Account of Carving Reality at the Joints.Peter Vallentyne - 1998 - Synthese 115 (2):171-198.
Added to index2010-04-27
Total downloads213 ( #18,696 of 2,178,194 )
Recent downloads (6 months)22 ( #14,537 of 2,178,194 )
How can I increase my downloads?