Realization Reductios, and Category Inclusion
Journal of Philosophy 107 (4):213-219 (2010)
Abstract
Thomas Polger and Laurence Shapiro argue that Carl Gillett's much publicized dimensioned theory of realization is incoherent, being subject to a reductio. Their argument turns on the fact that Gillett's definition of realization makes property instances the exclusive relata of the realization relation, while his belief in multiple realization implies its denial, namely, that properties are the relata of the realization relation on occasions of multiple realization. Others like Sydney Shoemaker have also expressed their view of realization in terms of property instances, yet they too have accepted the multiple realizability of properties. Thus I am interested in the more general issue raised by Polger and Shapiro's argument. Specifically, I show how to supplement a theory of realization with a category-inclusive auxiliary assumption, which avoids the stated reductio. I then offer a few reasons to justify the proposed category-inclusive view of realization, making some comparisons to supervenience and causation along the way.Author's Profile
ISBN(s)
0022-362X
DOI
10.5840/jphil2010107416
My notes
Similar books and articles
Realization and the metaphysics of mind.Thomas W. Polger - 2007 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85 (2):233 – 259.
Two Confusions Concerning Multiple Realization.Thomas W. Polger - 2008 - Philosophy of Science 75 (5):537-547.
Multiply realizing scientific properties and their instances.Carl Gillett - 2011 - Philosophical Psychology 24 (6):727-738.
Guidelines for theorizing about realization.Kevin Morris - 2010 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 48 (4):393-416.
Analytics
Added to PP
2010-04-27
Downloads
734 (#11,725)
6 months
52 (#25,332)
2010-04-27
Downloads
734 (#11,725)
6 months
52 (#25,332)
Historical graph of downloads
Author's Profile
Citations of this work
Moving beyond the subset model of realization: The problem of qualitative distinctness in the metaphysics of science.Carl Gillett - 2010 - Synthese 177 (2):165 - 192.
Flat Versus Dimensioned: the What and the How of Functional Realization.Ronald P. Endicott - 2011 - Journal of Philosophical Research 36:191-208.
On two arguments for subset inheritance.Kevin Morris - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 163 (1):197-211.
Resolving arguments by different conceptual traditions of realization.Ronald Endicott - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 159 (1):41-59.
References found in this work
Epiphenomenal and supervenient causation.Jaegwon Kim - 1984 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 9 (1):257-70.
The dimensions of realization: a critique of the Standard view.C. Gillett - 2002 - Analysis 62 (4):316-323.
Mental causation and Shoemaker-realization.Brian P. McLaughlin - 2007 - Erkenntnis 67 (2):149 - 172.
Essentialism, mental properties, and causation.Frank Jackson - 1995 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 95:253-268.