Sincerity and manipulation under approval voting

Theory and Decision 74 (3):335-355 (2013)
  Copy   BIBTEX


Under approval voting, each voter can nominate as many candidates as she wishes and the election winners are those candidates that are nominated most often. A voter is said to have voted sincerely if she prefers all those candidates she nominated to all other candidates. As there can be a set of winning candidates rather than just a single winner, a voter’s incentives to vote sincerely will depend on what assumptions we are willing to make regarding the principles by which voters extend their preferences over individual candidates to preferences over sets of candidates. We formulate two such principles, replacement and deletion, and we show that, under approval voting, a voter who accepts those two principles and who knows how the other voters will vote will never have an incentive to vote insincerely. We then discuss the consequences of this result for a number of standard principles of preference extension in view of sincere voting under approval voting.



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 86,168

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library


Added to PP

138 (#113,171)

6 months
1 (#862,753)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Ulle Endriss
University of Amsterdam

Citations of this work

Add more citations

References found in this work

Measurement Theory.Fred S. Roberts (ed.) - 1985 - Cambridge University Press.
Even-chance lotteries in social choice theory.Peter C. Fishburn - 1972 - Theory and Decision 3 (1):18-40.
Choosers as extension axioms.Bora Erdamar & M. Remzi Sanver - 2009 - Theory and Decision 67 (4):375-384.

Add more references