P. Kyle Stanford exceeding our grasp: Science, history, and the problem of unconceived alternatives

Abstract This article has no associated abstract. (fix it)
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1093/bjps/axn042
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 35,507
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Scientific Realism and the Stratagema de Divide Et Impera.Timothy D. Lyons - 2006 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 57 (3):537-560.
In Defense of Convergent Realism.Clyde L. Hardin & Alexander Rosenberg - 1982 - Philosophy of Science 49 (4):604-615.
Realism, Empiricism and Scientific Revolutions.Patrick Enfield - 1991 - Philosophy of Science 58 (3):468-485.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

In Defense of the Epistemic Imperative.Seungbae Park - 2018 - Axiomathes 28 (4):435-446.
The Anti-Induction for Scientific Realism.Seungbae Park - 2018 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 95 (3):329-342.
Inductions, Red Herrings, and the Best Explanation for the Mixed Record of Science.P. D. Magnus - 2010 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 61 (4):803-819.
Expanding Our Grasp: Causal Knowledge and the Problem of Unconceived Alternatives.Matthias Egg - 2016 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 67 (1):115-141.

View all 6 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total downloads
136 ( #44,399 of 2,287,565 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
5 ( #97,761 of 2,287,565 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads

My notes

Sign in to use this feature